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INTRODUCTION 
Trade continues to play an important role in the South African economy after 
democratisation. The degree of dependence upon foreign trade has been hovering around 
50% since 2000, in comparison to the ratio in the early 1990s, which was around 35%.1 
Exports are regarded as an engine to achieve robust and sustainable growth for the 
country as a whole. Trade policy is inevitably a basic policy of a country. In general, it is 
planned and decided in line with domestic development programmes as well as 
international obligations. This is because trade policy amalgamates factors from both 
international and domestic contexts.z In other words, trade policy is part of economic 
policy and, at the same time, part of foreign policy. In terms of the external aspect, South 
Africa's trade policy is, as with other member countries of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), naturally influenced by international trade rules and multilateral trade 
negotiations, which have been governed by the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATI) and its successor, the WTO. 
Under the current legal system of the WTO, the obligations of a developing country 
differ from those of a developed country. It is well-known that the WTO adopted a 
non-discrimination principle which requires that all members be treated equally under 
WTO law. However, the principle of special and differential treatment (SD1) allows 
developing countries in the WTO system to opt out of obligations that they might 
I World Bank World Development Indicators. 
2 Evans (1999: 622) calls this character of the trade policy "intermestic" and regards, other than trade 
policy, commerce, fiscal stability, investment policy, drugs, and immigration as obvious examples of 
intermestic issues. 
Makino, Kumiko, and Chizuko Sa to, eds. P11blic Poliry and Transfomlation in South Africa after De111ocratisation. Spot Survey 
33. Chiba: IDE-JETRO, 2013. 
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otherwise have as non-discrimination. The SDT principle is based on the concept of 
substantial equality which ensures the equality of opportunity for developing countries in 
spite of differential level of development between developed countries and developing 
countries. The SDT principle allows developing countries to have flexibility in their trade 
policy and to get preferential treatments from developed countries3. 
South Africa changed its status in the GATT /WTO from being a developed country to 
a developing country when a new democratic government was born in 1994. Only South 
Africa, in the history of the GATT/WTO, has changed its status in this way. Did this 
particularity of South Africa affect its trade policy? If so, how? This chapter, therefore, 
examines South African trade policy by focusing on the interactions between South 
Africa's trade policy and the WTO. After the introductory section, Section 1 looks at trade 
policy during the democratic transition period, which greatly influenced the future 
direction of South Africa's trade policy. Section 2 deals with the WTO commitments that 
South Africa has to implement domestically, while Section 3 discusses the country's 
attitude toward the WTO. The final section provides a summary of the chapter. 
1. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION PERIOD 
South Africa was a founding member of the GATT, which was signed in 1947. It also 
participated in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, which was held to agree upon a 
series of new rules for the post-World War II international monetary system.4 During 
this period, South Africa was considered a "western" state (Erasmus 2005: 352) and was 
expected to play a leading role in international economic stability in the postwar world. 
South Africa itself actively worked in the GATT to strengthen the open world trading 
system by eliminating discriminatory trading blocs. 
However, the racial discrimination policy, apartheid, made South Africa suffer from 
both multilateral and bilateral sanctions, which isolated it from international society for a 
long time. South Africa was barred from participation in international organisations and 
conferences. For example, in 1974, the United Nations General Assembly suspended 
South Africa from participation in its work, due to international opposition to the policy 
of apartheid.S Rarely for international organisations, South Africa could keep its seat in 
the GATT and participated in multilateral trade negotiations even though it was not an 
3 Within the WTO legal system, SDT has taken two main forms: provisions providing preferential access 
for developing country exports to the markets of developed countries and provisions allowing for a 
modulation of commitments by different types of member (IISD 2003). The principle of SDT is 
designed to promote developing countries' integration into the WTO system by granting them 
preferential treatment. 
4 It participated in the conference as the Union of South Africa. 
5 To be exact, the President of the General Assembly ruled that the South African delegation to the 
General Assembly could not continue to participate in the work of the Twenty-Nine Session of the 
Assembly because the delegation's credentials had not been accepted by the Assembly. All other organs 
in the United Nations derive their membership through election by the Gene.ral Assembly. Therefore, 
South Africa could not work in any of these organs (Jhabvala 1977: 615-617). South Africa was 
re-admitted to the UN in 1994 following its transition to a democracy. 
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active participant. In 1986, when the eighth multilateral trade negotiation under the 
GATT, the Uruguay Round, was launched at Punta del Este, not a few members called 
for the expulsion of South Africa. However, this proposal was not accepted. Throughout 
the apartheid era, South Mrica worked in the GATT without changing its status as a 
developed country. 
After the then President FW de Klerk took the fateful decision to abolish apartheid in 
1990, South Africa experienced drastic and fundamental political change in the early 
1990s. There were hard debates between the de Klerk administration and the tripartite 
alliance consisting of the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South 
Mrican Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP) on all 
kinds of policies for post-apartheid South Africa. Especially over economic policy, fierce 
controversy arose in political, financial and academic circles (J\tfarais 2011: 97-111 ). Over 
trade policy, however, both sides agreed on trade liberalisation in order to realize 
export-oriented industrialisation. 
These controversies over policy coincided with the final stage of the Uruguay Round. 
When the de Klerk administration substantially participated in the negotiations, an outline 
for a final agreement had already been f1.xed. One of the items was that all developed 
countries, including South Africa, were supposed to lower their tariffs by one third on 
average. The de Klerk administration agreed to substantial trade liberalisation by offering 
sharp and comprehensive tariff reduction, covering 98% of all industrial products. In 
addition, South Mrica undertook to implement a tariffication process that would replace 
its remaining non-tariff barriers, such as quotas or import levies, with an equivalent tariff. 
The following are the detailed commitments that the de Klerk administration promised in 
the final agreement of the Uruguay Round; 
• reduce industrial tariffs by one third from 1995 to 2000, with the exception of 
clothing, textiles and motor vehicle industries, where the phase-down was over the 
period 1995-2003; 
• rationalize over 12,000 tariff lines, and unilaterally reduce the number of tariff 
bands to six (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 30%), with the exception of clothing, 
textiles and motor vehicle industries; 
• increase the number of bindings for industrial products from 55% to 98% for all 
lines, and replace all quantitative restrictions (QRs) and formula duties with bound 
ad valorem rates; 
• convert all QRs on agricultural products to ad valorem rates, lower agricultural 
tariffs by a minimum of 15% individually and by 21% on average, and reduce 
agricultural subsidies by an export weighted amount of 36%; and 
• phase out the export subsidies scheme (the General Export Incentive Scheme: 
GElS) by the end of 1997 (Alves and Edwards 2009: 93). 
Although South Africa had to accept requirements under the Uruguay Round, such as 
lowering its import tariff levels by one third, and although it stated its commitment to an 
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export-oriented economic development policy and trade liberalisation, the comprehensive 
and drastic tariff reduction was not a requirement that it had to fulfil in order to meet its 
responsibilities in the GATI. The following four factors made South Africa do more than 
was expected. 
Firstly, President de Klerk embarked on a new diplomacy based on 
non-confrontational relations with the outside world (Landsberg 2010: 59). Central to de 
Klerk's foreign policy was the desire to end South Africa's isolation from international 
society. Therefore, it set "re-integration into the global economy" as a basic target in and 
after 1990 when South Africa declared its abandonment of the policy of apartheid. 
International society also expected South Africa to rejoin the world economy and it 
applied strong pressure on South Africa to liberalise its trade policy. For example, the 
GATT Council evaluated South African trade policy and practice in June 1993,6 at the 
time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and demanded further liberalisation. The report 
stated: 
7. Council members stressed that South Mrica's tariff structure was complex 
and far from transparent . ...... Members also urged South Africa to 
improve its Uruguay Round tariff offer; 
29. In conclusion, the Council recognized that the South African economy 
was subject to many constraints. . . . South Africa . . . should make every 
effort to align its economy fully with the multilateral trading system. The 
Council stressed the benefits to be obtained from a resolute pursuit of 
trade liberalization. It also emphasized that a successful outcome of the 
Uruguay Round would provide external discipline for the liberalization 
process, assisting South Africa in its reintegration into the world economy 
(GATT 1993). 
For the de Klerk administration, the Uruguay Round was a good chance to establish its 
presence in international society by aggressively accepting its responsibilities in the 
GATT. 
Secondly, while, internationally, the latter stage of Uruguay Round negotiation was 
happening, South Africa itself was in the middle of a heated domestic argument over 
economic policy. Even the basic direction of South Africa's economic policy had not 
been determined, so the government could not formulate its trade policy. It did not have 
any strong objectives to the Uruguay Round nor did it lead trade negotiations. Therefore, 
priority was given to the wish to realize "re-integration into the global economy'' by 
establishing a presence in the GATI. 
Thirdly, South Africa joined the negotiation of the Uruguay Round after the 
negotiation framework had already been established. Officials of the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) found it difficult to stay ahreast of discussions 
6 This evaluation was conducted as the first Trade Policy Review of South Africa under the trade policy 
review mechanism. 
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during the early stages of the Uruguay Round, because other African governments 
actively opposed their participation. Although South Africa was not officially kicked out 
of the GATI, it could not actively participate. The Uruguay Round had started in 1984, 
and by 1990, when South Africa began to participate in the negotiations, it was already 
decided that all the developed countries in the GAIT were supposed to reduce their 
industrial tariffs by one third. Actually, it was by March 1990 that South Africa had to 
submit its proposal for the reduction of its tariffs.7 South Africa had no choice but to 
accept the GAIT's requirements at that point. 
And, fourthly, South Mrica had been regarded as a developed country in the GATI 
since the organisation's beginning. It was therefore asked to undertake the obligations of 
a developed country with regard to access in key markets, including agriculture, industrial 
tariffs and services. 
Coinciding with the end of apartheid, the closing stages of the Uruguay Round 
provided South Africa with an opportunity to reintegrate itself into the international 
society of political and economic cooperation, and so accelerate the liberalisation and 
simplification of its trade regime. The "Final Act!' to conclude the Uruguay Round was 
signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. The very next tnonth after the adoption 
of the Marrakesh Agreement, Mandela became the president of a democratic South 
Africa. 
2. TAKING OVER WTO COMMITMENTS 
The new South African government, assuming office in May 1994, conducted policies by 
rejecting the measures of the former party. However, it did not challenge the Uruguay 
Round commitments, which were handed down by the previous administration. Keet 
(2002: 6) regards this as understandable under the circumstances. During the period just 
after the transition, the priority in policy was to build a new nation by freeing the 
economy from the effects and structural distortions of apartheid. In order to make 
apartheid a matter of history, the new government faced many problems all at the same 
time. Even economic policy was in a process of trial and error. The new government did 
not have enough capacity to build a firm trade policy. In addition, the commitments that 
South Africa made at the Uruguay Round were both legally binding and essential if South 
Africa was to be integrated into the global economy (Keet 2002: 6). 
The ANC government conceived of the export-led growth model as a path in which 
South Africa could accelerate its economic growth in accordance with liberal philosophy. 
The ANC government had also intention to reduce the monopoly power of large 
conglomerates which has been associated with the National Party government and the 
isolation resulting from international sanctions (Cling 2001: 104). The opening of trade 
has therefore been envisaged as one of the ways in which to break away from the 
7 In fact, the submission of South Africa's offer list was delayed until September 1990 (GATT 1990a; 
1990b). South Africa might have needed the time to reconsider its proposal because President de Klerk 
had just announced the liberalisation of the economy in February 1990. 
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previous order. 
Moreover, the new government had to guide the country towards a constructive 
international role with special responsibilities not only in the southern African region or 
on the African continent, but also in the global economy. The Mandela government was 
interested in being a full and respected member of the family of nations. It was eager to 
attain a new reputation for being a good global citizen (ANC 1994). In 1995, the WTO 
was established and South Africa was a founding member. There was a global trend at 
that time to strengthen an open world trading system with a free flow of goods, services 
and investment. Under such circumstances, it was natural for South Africa to continue 
with substantial liberalisation by taking over the international commitments of the 
previous regime. s 
All the WTO agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round negotiations applied 
to all WTO members. Each member accepted all the agreements as a single package with 
a single signature. 9 The WTO agreements consist of an umbrella agreement and several 
annexed agreements for the three broad areas of trade: goods, services and intellectual 
property. For goods, the WTO agreements mainly relate to non-tariff measures such as 
anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, the 
application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, subsidies and 
countervailing measures and safeguards. The Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) and the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement are part of that 
package. The only exceptions to this package are a couple of "plurilateral" agreements, 
such as the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). When it joined 
the WTO, South Africa became a contracting party to a set of these WTO agreements. 
In the sense of obligations, the schedules of commitments constitute the core of the 
agreements. In these, each member country lists its binding commitments on tariffs for 
goods. Other than this, South Africa, as a member of the WTO, has to make its domestic 
regulations compatible with these WTO agreements. 
2.1 Tariff Reduction 
Based on the Uruguay Round agreements mentioned in Section 1, South Africa started to 
reduce its overall tariff rate in 1995. South Africa could reach its goal sooner than 
promised. As a result, simple mean most-favoured-nation tariffs for manufactured 
products fell from 18.0% in 1993 to 6.0% in 1999 (Table 1). 
s As a matte.r of fact, some foreign and local economists warned the risks linked to this opening up. 
However, the warnings have been largely ignored because the risks were uncertain (Cling 2001: 104). 
9 This system for decision-making in the GAIT /WTO is called a "single undertaking" approach. 
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Table 1 Tariff Rates in South Africa* 
(%) 
1991 1993 1996 1997 1999 2001 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Ail products 9.9 15.8 13.8 7.3 6.0 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.5 7.7 
Primary 6.4 8.1 7.7 6.8 6.0 6.7 6.0 4.9 4.7 5.9 
Manufacturing 11.0 18.0 16.2 7.4 6.0 8.4 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 
Source: World Bank database. 
*Most-favoured-nation and simple mean rates. 
In order to keep to its WTO commitments, South Africa has also simplified its 
complex tariff structure by reducing the number of tariff lines and cutting back the 
number of tariff bands (fable 2). Besides, it converted all the quantitative controls on 
agricultural products to ad valorem duties and eliminated its export subsidies scheme. 
Table 2 Structure of Tariffs in South Africa 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 
Number of tariff lines 12,475 11,231 7,773 7,919 6,697 
Duty-free tariff lines 
(% all lines) 24% 26% 42% 44% 53% 
International tariff 43.7% 43.5% 39.4% 35.1% 21.2% 
spikes*(% all lines) 
Source: Edwards (2005); Flatters and Stern (2007: 5). 
* Tariff spikes are tariff rates that exceed a certain threshold value usually 
taken to be three times the overall simple bound rate, or above 15 per cent. 
2.2 Anti-dumping System 
Anti-dumping is a countermeasure for the injury done to a domestic industry as a result 
of imports of "dumped" goods. It has a long history, and, at the time of the GAIT 
negotiations, it was a well-known and accepted practice. The GAIT of 1947 propounded 
Article VI, which allows a member country to impose anti-dumping duties unilaterally. In 
the Kennedy Round (1963-67), an Anti-dumping Code was adopted in order to make 
anti-dumping rules more precise.1o As anti-dumping practices have become a policy 
to In particular, it sought to ensure speedy and fair investigations, and it imposed limits on the 
retrospective application of anti-dumping measures. 
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option to protect domestic firms by providing for administrative measures (Deardorff 
and Stern 2004: 1 ), both developed and developing countries have made use of 
anti-dumping measures. As anti-dumping measures proliferated, the chance to use them 
as a protectionist tool increased. The GAIT has tried to strengthen anti-dumping rules at 
every multilateral trade negotiation. Consequently, of all the WTO agreements, the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) prescribes the strictest and most advanced rules. 
Therefore most of the developing countries have difficulties in enforcing all the 
requirements of the WTO ADA in their domestic anti-dumping legislation. South Africa, 
however, could carry out reforms of its anti-dumping scheme and make them consistent 
with the ADA, because it had shaped as highly a developed anti-dumping system as the 
industrialized countries through various legislative changes. 
South Africa's anti-dumping legislation will mark a centenary next year. South Africa 
was the fourth country in the world to introduce anti-dumping legislation in 1914,11 
following Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Its first anti-dumping measure was 
imposed in 1921 by the Customs Department, and the responsibility for dealing with 
anti-dumping remedies was taken over by the Board on Trade and Industries (BTI) in 
1923 Qoubert 2005). Since then, it has initiated about 1,000 anti-dumping investigations. 
South Africa was one of the most frequent users of anti-dumping measures in the 20th 
century. It has also been a major user in the first 15 years of the WTO (Brink 2012). 
South Africa embarked on a process of rapid liberalisation by lowering tariff 
protection in line with that in the developed countries. This left domestic firms facing 
increased competition from both fair and unfair international trade. With tariff reductions, 
trade remedies such as anti-dumping and countervailing measures became increasingly 
important for domestic producers to protect themselves from the rise in imports. This led 
to a sharp increase in South Africa's application of trade remedies, in particular 
anti-dumping measures. 
In 1995, South Africa made some amendments to bring its anti-dumping regime more 
into line with the WTO agreement.12 However, there were still pressures from other 
WTO members to make South Mrica's anti-dumping regime strictly conform to \VfO 
rules. As a result, South Africa finally passed the International Trade Administration 
(ITA) Act in 2003, which requires more precise pre-investigation before taking an 
anti-dumping measure. In this legislation, a new body was created in order to carry out 
remedies for trade problems. Since then, it has become more difficult to use anti-dumping 
measures as a protectionist tool. Because its anti-dumping regime was highly developed, 
South Africa could respond to the WTO commitment in the field of anti-dumping in the 
same way as the developed countries. 
(http:/ /worldtradereview.com/webpage.asp?wiD=43T). 
t t The Customs Tariff Act of 1914. 
12 For example, the definition of anti-dumping was changed and certain new concepts, such as 'normal 
value,' were introduced. 
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2.3 Intellectual Property Law 
The TRIPs Agreement sets the rnin.imum standards for intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in trade-related areas for WTO members and requires them to provide an 
appropriate legal framework for IPR protection, including legislation such as intellectual 
property laws and the enforcement of these laws. The TRIPs Agreement covers various 
types of intellectual property 13 with substantive provisions. 14 There were some 
developing countries that had no intellectual property laws in some IPR categories at the 
time of the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement. Such members had to incorporate new 
laws to protect IPR Under the principle of SDT, the TRIPs Agreement contains some 
flexibility provisions that provide for grace periods. While developed countries had to 
comply with the TRIPs Agreement within one year from the date of effect of the TRIPs 
Agreement, in other words before 1 January 1996, developing countries had to do so 
within five years, until1 January 2000, with some exceptions.lS 
Like its anti-dumping regime, South Africa has a 1 00-year-old system of intellectual 
property laws, which originated with the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright 
Act of 1916. Since then, many related laws and regulations have been enacted or 
amended. t6 Since the TRIPs Agreement was adopted, South Africa has carried out many 
legal reforms in the form of upgrading, amending and making laws. Some of them were 
aimed at keeping the law compatible with the TRIPs Agreement. For example, the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act (1997) was enacted in order to comply with 
the TRIPs Agreement. However, most of them have been conducted in order to 
harmonise intellectual property law with other domestic legislation (feljeur 2002) or in 
order to make intellectual property law conform to new situations which are beyond the 
assumed scope of the law, for example, computer programming and the effective use of 
intellectual property resulting from publicly financed research. 17 
South Africa's IPR regime is quite advanced and mature in terms of its legal framework 
and is regarded as at the same level as developed countries (feljeur 2002: 40, 61). 
Therefore, South Africa was considered a developed country under the TRIPs Agreement. 
13 The TRIPs Agreement explicidy covers copyrights and related rights, patents, trademarks, geographical 
indications, layout-designs of integrated circuits, industrial designs and undisclosed information, 
inclucling trade secrets and test data. 
14 However, certain provisions of the TRIPs Agreement are cited as examples of a non-self-executing 
treaty (WIPO 2010: 8). In this paper, prepared by the WIPO Secretariat, the situation is regarded as 
unclear as to whether members of the WTO are able to apply the agreement direcdy or they have to 
incorporate it into national law through legislation. 
IS Least-developed countries (LDCs), because of their economic level, are given ten years from the 
general enforcement date to comply with their TRIPs obligations. After the Doha Ministerial 
Conference, LDCs were given a further extension until 1 July 2013 to ensure that their IPR regimes are 
in line with their TRIPs obligations. 
16 This Act was replaced by inclividual specific laws such as the Copyright Act (1978), the Patents Act 
(1978), the Trade Marks Act (1993), the Designs Act (1993). These Acts have been elaborated and 
developed by amendments. In other areas of lPR, new laws were passed, such as the Merchandise 
Marks Act (1941) and the Counterfeit Goods Act (1997). 
17 The Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research (IPR) Act, 2009. 
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Actually it did not need to make a lot of effort, for instance, by amending laws, in order 
to be accepted as having met the requirements of the TRIPs Agreement. However, 
Teljeur pointed to a concern that South Africa's intellectual property laws are too 
advanced for the country's stage of development. She provides two perspectives: (i) South 
Africa was well ahead of its middle-income country peers and ready to engage with 
international trading partners on equal terms; and (ii) South Mrican intellectual property 
laws were an apartheid-relic and inappropriate for a country in the early stages of its 
reintegration into the world economy. The reality of South Africa's IPR regime is, as she 
reveals, a rather mixed picture of the two (Teljeur 2002: 5). 
2.4 Government Procurement 
Government agencies need to procure goods, services and works to carry out their policy 
objectives. The size of the government procurement market is very big. It typically 
accounts for 10-15% of a country's GDP. 18 One characteristic of a government 
procurement system is that it is prone to a preference for its own country's goods and 
services. The use of preferential procurement as a tool to promote social and industrial 
policies has been widely adopted in developing countries as well as in developed countries 
(METI 2011; Manchidi and Harmond 2002). Therefore GATT Article III: 8 (a) 
specifically exempts government procurement from the requirement of national 
treatment. 
However, as a matter of fact, the government procurement system can be a non-tariff 
barrier and distort the international flow of products and services by discriminating 
against foreign suppliers (METI 2011). As government procurement markets constitute 
an important part of international trade, the GATT recognized the necessity to apply 
national treatment in government procurement. D uring the Tokyo Round (1971-79), a 
Government Procurement Code was negotiated and adopted as part of the Tokyo 
Code,19 which required signatories to provide national treatment to other signatories20. 
As one result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) replaced and strengthened the Government Procurement Code. It is 
a "pluri-lateral" agreement, in other words it is excluded from the package of Uruguay 
Round agreements, which means that not all WTO members are bound by it. The 
Agreement currently has 15 parties. These are mainly major industrialized economies but 
some developing countries have also joined, such as Armenia, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Chinese Taipei21. As for South Africa, it is neither a party nor even an 
observer to the GPA. It has reason not to accede to the GP A. 
18 See the WTO homepage (http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm) and the 
USTR bomepage (http:/ /www.ustr.gov /trade-topics/ government-procurement). 
t9 The Tokyo Code was only applicable to GATT members who signed it. 
20 In addition to national treatment, the Government Procurement Code also stipulated 
most-favoured-nation treatment. 
21 Several countries such as China, Jordan, and Moldova, are currently under the accession negotiation 
process to the GPA. 
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The main characteristics of government procurement in South Africa are targeted 
procurement 22 and a constitutional principle. Prior to 1994, the South Mrican 
government procured almost all goods and services from large, established and white 
businesses. It was difficult for small and marginalized black businesses to join this 
procurement system. During the transition period, there was a conflict of views on the 
use of government procurement between the de Klerk administration and the tripartite 
alliance. The tripartite alliance regarded government procurement as a policy instrument 
to empower people who had historically been disadvantaged as a result of unfair 
discrimination. This notion is represented in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme in Section 4.4.7.7 and the 1996 Constitution of South Africa in Section 217, 
which permits government agencies to make use of preferential procurement. By contrast, 
the de I<lerk administration did not attach much importance to government procurement 
as an instrument to implement socio-economic policies. Based on this attitude, the de 
I<lerk government stated its intention to eliminate preferences in government 
procurement in its reply to the GATT Council on the Trade Policy Review (GATT 1993). 
Besides, there was no explicit provision that addressed the use of government 
procurement as a policy tool to correct past imbalances in the 1993 Constitution (in 
Section 187) (Bolton 2006: 203). 
South Africa chose not to accede to the GPA due to these controversial views. This 
allowed South Africa to employ an affirmative government procurement system as a 
significant policy measure to uplift groups that had previously suffered from 
discrimination. South Africa has elaborated very complex laws and regulations on 
government procurement, including the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
of 2000 and the Public Procurement Act of 2001. The Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE)23 scheme also gives preferential treatment to a previously disadvantaged group in 
the government procurement process. Even though it is under continuous pressure from 
its trading partners to accede to the GPA, South Africa has to keep to its policy of not 
signing the GPA in order to make its BEE policy legitimate (Bolton 2008: 795). By 
asserting the status of a developing country, South Africa regards preferential 
procurement as necessary for its socio-economic development. If the GPA were part of 
the package of Uruguay Round agreements, South Africa would face difficulties in 
making its BEE policy consistent with WTO rules.24 
22 A targeted procurement is defined as a system of procurement to provide employment and business 
opportunities for marginalized individuals and communities (Manchidi and Harmond 2002). 
23 The BEE is a programme launched by the South African government to redress the inequalities of 
apartheid by giving previously disadvantaged groups (black Africans, Coloureds and Indians who are 
South African citizens) economic opportunities that were previously not available to them. It includes 
measures such as employment equity, skills development, ownership, management, socio-economic 
development and preferential procurement. 
24 In relation to the interaction between trade and competition policy, South Africa said "there is no 
clarity on how the concept of non-discrimination will or will not prevent developing countries from 
implementing their development policies, such as South Africa's Black Empowerment policy" (Khor 
2003b). 
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3. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WTO 
Mter the transition in 1994, democratic South Mrica, as described above, has positively 
kept the previous government's word as a developed country at the Uruguay Round 
negotiation. At the same time, however, newly born South Africa has expressed its own 
attitude as a developing country at the WTO. 
3.1 Singapore Issues 
The Uruguay Round has already introduced new areas into the multilateral trading system, 
such as services and intellectual property rights, which have led to the expansion of the 
scope of the WTO. Even after the Uruguay Round, the developed countries kept up the 
pressure to incorporate more and more issues into the WTO. Mainly, but not only, on the 
initiative of the European Union (EU), four new issues were introduced as subjects for 
discussion at the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in D ecember 1996: 
investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade 
facilitation. 
Many developing countries opposed the idea to deal with these four issues as part of 
the negotiating agenda at the WTO. They thought that (i) the capacity of each developing 
country to handle new issues is insufficient because developing countries are already 
facing problems implementing the Uruguay Round agreements, (ii) there are strong 
concerns that new issues might damage developing countries once trade rules are 
established on these issues; and (iii) the new issues are beyond the trade topics that the 
WTO is supposed to cover (Keet 2002; Khor 2003a). South Africa stood in line with 
other developing countries and supported the position that Tanzania expressed at the 
Singapore Ministerial Meeting on behalf of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), of which South Africa is a member. 
In the two years of WTO existence, SADC member countries have, despite 
sincere efforts, been struggling with limited success to meet their obligations 
as provided for under the WT O agreements. Our capacity therefore to take 
on new commitments over and above our existing obligations under the 
built-in agenda would be limited .... this Ministerial Meeting should focus on 
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements (WT O 1996). 
South Africa insisted that the Singapore issues would place enormous burdens on WTO 
members (Kohr 2003a) and that it would have no more commitments other than the 
Uruguay Round agreements.zs South Africa, with emphasis on its being a developing 
country, especially an African country, conceived the trade system should have more 
25 South Africa again expressed a denial on inclusion of the Singapore issues in the economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) negotiation between the EU and the SADC (Inter Press Service, ''TRADE: South 
Africa Won't 'Roll Over' on Singapore Issues," Sam Nzioki, 13 October 2007). 
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equitable and development friendly rules. In order to encourage developing members to 
engage on Singapore issues, South Africa thought that the sequence was of importance. 
The negotiations to ensure developing countries' issues should be addressed first, SDT, 
TRIPs-public health, agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiation and 
only then Singapore issues (Khor 2003b). 
Despite the strong opposition of developing countries, these four new subjects, which 
are categorized as Singapore issues, were originally included on the Doha D evelopment 
Agenda (DDA). However, at the 2003 Canclin Ministerial Conference, WTO members 
could not reach a consensus on identifying the Singapore issues, except with regard to 
trade facilitation, as part of the negotiating agenda of the DDA. 
3.2 New Round 
Since the WTO established, South Mrica has took the position as a developing country at 
the wro and strengthened the cooperation with the group of developing countries 
especially with the Africa group. This posture was explicitly shown in the argument on 
setting up a new round from 1998 to 1999. 
Based on the Uruguay Round agreements, the mandated negotiation on agriculture and 
services was to start in 2000 (so-called "built-in agenda''). On this occasion, the United 
States initiated a new and comprehensive round of trade negotiation including not only 
Singapore Issues but also other new areas such as environment and labour. The 
developed countries, led by the United States and the EU, aimed to launch the 
"Millennium Round" at the Third Ministerial Meeting held in Seattle in 1999. 
Against the pressure from developed countries, developing countries expressed strong 
opposition to launch a new round. As mentioned above, most developing countries were 
still dealing with problems implementing the Uruguay Round agreements. They did not 
want to take any new commitment which might impose further burdens on them (Keet 
2002: 7). South Africa itself could respond to the commitment resulted from the Uruguay 
Round. However, in order to strengthen an alliance with other developing countries, 
South Africa took a general position against the setup of a new round (WTO 1999a; 
1999b). 
At the same time, however, South Africa hoisted a flag of "re-integration into the 
global economy." Its economic policy framework based on neoliberal globalisation which 
resulted in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme internally 
and the policy to make a world trading system further liberalized externally (Keet 2002). 
As a matter of fact, Keet (2002: 7) pointed out that "South Africa's multilateral trade 
officials, whether in Geneva or Pretoria, in fact shifted quite rapidly . . . towards an 
approach explicitly preparing for a new multi-sectoral round." In 2001, at the last stage of 
preparing for a new round, South Africa was to play even a key role for launching it 
(Ismail2011: 10). 
South Africa showed a complicated and sometimes contradictory attitude toward the 
WTO at this period. On one hand, South Africa opposed a comprehensive and ambitious 
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round because it went along with developing countries as a member of the African group 
at the WTO. On the other hand, it supported a new round because it needed the free, 
open and rule-based multilateral trading system for its economic development. 
3.3 Do ha Development Agenda 
The WTO launched the DDA at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 2001. The DDA has 
nine areas that are up for negotiation on the agenda, such as agriculture (including cotton), 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA), services, rules (including anti-dumping, 
non-agricultural subsidies and countervailing measures), trade facilitation, development 
(including the revision of SDT provisions), TRIPs, and the environment. South Africa 
actively participates in all these areas, intensively negotiating in the fields of agriculture, 
NAMA, and services. It participates in or creates negotiating groups in some areas. For 
example, in the negotiations on agriculture, South Africa is a member of the Cairns 
Group, and in the NAMA negotiation it is a core member of the NA1\1A 11 group of 
developing countries. 
Through the DDA negotiation, South Africa seems to focus more on acquiring 
flexibility for the developing countries as a whole than on realizing its own national 
interests. The main objective of South .Africa in the DDA negotiations is to make the 
current unfair multilateral trading system more favourable for developing countries 
(Ism ail 2011) and to correct inequalities between the developed and developing countries 
in the WTO (WTO 2003; 2005; 2010). In order to realize a sustainable trade system, 
South Africa aims to reduce/ eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on products which 
have an influence on developing countries' trade and to make development-friendly trade 
rules. This was because South .Africa thought that the WTO system was still in favour of 
the developed countries and that a structural shift in the WTO was necessary in terms of 
development objective. The DTI listed South Africa's objectives in the DDA; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
To ensure that developmental issues are at the centre of the WTO agenda and 
the multilateral trading system, 
To address the imbalances in existing WTO agreements, 
To strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system vs unilateralism, 
To reduce protectionism against products of export interest to South Africa and 
other developing countries, especially in agriculture, 
To ensure meaningful African participation (DTI 2003) . 
From a look at these objectives, it can be seen that South Africa at the DDA thinks of 
itself as a leader of the developing countries. This is not trade policy, but foreign policy. 
Nowadays, it makes use of the WTO as a forum to realize its foreign policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trade policy of South Africa, as with other members of the GATI /WTO, has been 
influenced by international trade rules and multilateral trade negotiations. However, two 
distinctive circumstances regarding South Africa make its trade policy different from 
others. Firstly, at the beginning of the 1990s, the process of democratisation in South 
Africa coincided with progress in the GATI Uruguay Round. Secondly, South Africa 
changed its status in the GATI /WT O from being a developed country to being a 
developing country when a new democratic government was born in 1994. 
When it returned from its long isolation, South Africa put the priority on 
" re-integration into the global economy'' and strongly wished to re-establish its presence 
in international society. South Africa swept away the policy of the apartheid age and 
attached importance to its responsibilities as a developed country and to keeping its 
system compatible with the GATI /WTO rules. D uring the Uruguay Round, only 
developed countries were supposed to offer to lower their tariff levels by one third on 
average. The then President de Klerk administration agreed to substantial trade 
liberalisation. The newly born, democratic South Africa had to take over this commitment 
to the GATI /WTO. At the beginning of the Mandela government, trade liberalisation 
was in line with the broader goal of "re-integration into the global economy." 
South Africa also signed agreements, as products of the Uruguay Round, stipulating 
strict rules on non-tariff measures, such as anti-dumping duties, subsidies, import licenses 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as setting standards on new issues like 
IPR. Because these agreements deeply influence domestic systems and policies, it is 
necessary for WTO members to reform their existing legal systems or to legislate new 
laws in order to be consistent with WTO requirements. Most developing countries are not 
willing to, and in some cases are not able to liberalise domestic regulations. Therefore, the 
WTO provides extra time for developing countries to fulfil their commitments in 
accordance with SDT provisions. However, South Africa reformed its anti-dumping and 
IPR systems without any grace period as a developed country. On the other hand, South 
Africa has not yet acceded to the GPA. 
The implementation of extensive tariff reductions began to have manifestly negative 
effects on production and employment within South Africa in the years that followed 
afterwards. South Africa has gradually changed its trade policy from actively promoting 
liberalisation to considering industrial protection. President Mbeki aptly described South 
Africa as a country of two nations; 
. .. South Africa is a country of two nations. One of these nations is white, 
relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has 
ready access to a developed economic, physical, education, communication 
and other infrastructure ... The second and larger nation of South Africa is 
black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the 
black rural population in general and the disabled (Cling 2001: 55). 
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In the latter half of the 1990s, South Africa wavered between two conflicting 
requirements; to fulfil its responsibilities as a developed country, and to protect its 
industries as a developing country. However, in the 2000s, South Africa has consolidated 
its position as a developing country in the WfO. Especially after the new round of trade 
talks, the DDA, was launched in 2001, South Mrica has willingly played a role as a leader 
of the developing countries. 
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